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FEDERAL AID TO STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENTIMPLICATIONS OF A NEW FEDERAL GRANT PROGRAM
Norman Abrams*
I. Introduction
In its recently published Report, the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice briefly summarized the diverse forms
of the federal government's "contribution to the national effort against crime":
The Federal Government carries much of the load of financing and administering the great social programs that the America's best hope of preventing crime and delinquency ....
The Federal Government has the direct responsibility for enforcing
major criminal statutes against, among other things, kidnapping, bank robbery,
racketeering, smuggling, counterfeiting, drug abuse and tax evasion. It has
a number of law enforcement agencies, a system of criminal courts and a
large correctional establishment....
The Federal Government has for many years provided information, advice and training to State and local law enforcement agencies.... In many
towns and counties, for example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
on-site training programs for police officers and sheriffs are the only systematic training programs available. The Department of Justice, under
the Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965, has begun to give State and
city agencies financial grants for research, for planning, and for demonstration projects.'
The Commission then proceeded "not only to endorse warmly federal participation in the effort to reduce delinquency and crime, but to urge that it be
intensified and accelerated." '
Until recently, the most significant form of federal participation in the
nation's law enforcement and criminal justice efforts has been what the Commission described as the federal government's direct responsibility for enforcing
major criminal statutes. Direct financial aid such as that provided under the
* Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles; Professor-in-Residence, Criminal Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., 1966-67.
1 TIE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S
CoMIssloN ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JuSTCE 283 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as CRIME

REPORT].

2 Id.
3 This phrase or the words "law enforcement" are used interchangeably in the text. These
words are used in the same sense as defined in H.R. 5037 as originally introduced into the
90th Congress. See section 501(a):
"Law enforcement and criminal justice" means all activities pertaining to crime
prevention or the enforcement and administration of the criminal law, including,
but not limited to, activities involving police, prosecution or defense of criminal
cases, courts, probation, corrections and parole.
As passed by the House in August, 1967,. the words "or defense" were not included in section 501 (a). The deletion may not result in a different scope for the legislation. If it does,
however, it is unfortunate, for any prograin in this area should be comprehensive. As the
Commission put it: "The relationships among the parts of the criminal justice system .. . are
so intimate and intricate that a change anywhere may be felt everywhere." CRIME REPORT 280.
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Law Enforcement Assistance Act4 has been relatively limited and is of recent vintage. Federal financing of social programs designed to reduce crime and delinquency is of larger dimensions, but its impact upon law enforcement has been
indirect and difficult to measure. If the Commission's principal recommendations
regarding the federal role in law enforcement are adopted, the major emphasis
on the federal level in this area may shift from direct law enforcement to direct
financial aid to state and local governments. For the Commission recommended
a large-scale program of federal spending to improve the quality of state and
local law enforcement and administration of justice.
The Federal program the Commission visualizes is a large one. During the
past fiscal year the Federal Government spent a total of about $20 million
on research into crime and delinquency, and another $7 million, under
the Law Enforcement Assistance Act, on research and demonstration
projects by local agencies of justice. The Commission is not in a position
to weigh against each other all the demands for funds that are made upon
the Federal Government. And so it cannot recommend the expenditure
of a specific number of dollars a year on the program it proposes. However,
it does see the program as one on which several hundred million dollars
annually could be profitably spent over the next decade. (Emphasis added.) 5
The Commission justified such a large federal financial support program
on three grounds: crime is a national phenomenon that does not respect geographical boundaries; there are important needs that individual jurisdictions
cannot meet alone; federal funds can be used to encourage changes that will
make criminal administration more effective and more fair. But at the same
time, the Commission felt it necessary to remind the reader that:
[T]he Commission is mindful of the special importance of avoiding any
invasion of state and local responsibility for law enforcement and criminal
justice, and its recommendation is based on its judgment that Federal support and collaboration of the sort outlined below are consistent with scrupulous respect for - and indeed strengthening of - that responsibility.'
The Commission's reminder is not unusual. Almost every public statement
by a public official about an expanded federal role in law enforcement and
criminal justice carries with it a similar caveat. Thus, in his 1967 message to
Congress on crime in America, the President stated: "The Federal Government
must not and will not try to dominate the system. It could not if it tried. Our
system of law enforcement is essentially local: based upon local initiative, generated by local energies and controlled by local officials." 7
This same theme has been repeated by the Attorney General:
But law enforcement is a local responsibility. As a nation we have
preached local law enforcement. As a nation we have practiced it. There are
more of New York's finest, the police of New York City, than there are Fed4
5

The Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 828.
Cansa REPORT 284.

6

Id. at 285.

7 White House Press Release, Feb. 6, 1967, p. 6. The President struck a similar note
in his most recent State of the Union Address on Jan. 17, 1968.
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eral law enforcement officers for the Nation. Los Angeles County has six
times more deputy sheriffs than there are deputy U.S. marshals for the whole
United States, and the Los Angeles Police Department is larger than the
sheriff's office.
A single county has twice as many probation service officers as the
entire Federal Probation Service. The Federal Bureau of Prisons has less
than 5 percent of the prison population of the Nation. The Federal judiciary
is but a tiny fraction of the judiciary of the States, smaller than the
judiciary of even a single State.
We would have it no other way. Our safety and our liberty depend
on the excellence of local and State law enforcement.,
A financial aid program as large as that envisaged by the Commission
inevitably raises important questions about the proper relationship among federal, state and local governments in the law enforcement and criminal justice
field. The question of federal versus state or local responsibility for a particular
governmental function is, of course, a pervasive one in our system, but it takes
on a special dimension in the law enforcement and criminal justice context. The
possibility that a federal financial support program might be used to lay the
foundation for the creation of a national police force or to permit the federal
government to control local law enforcement is often raised as a spectre, albeit
sometimes for partisan purposes.' The related issue of the role to be played by
state government in implementing such a financial aid program is also a subject of some controversy. These issues, currently before the Congress in connection with proposed legislation designed to implement the Commission's
recommendations, merit detailed examination.
II.

A National Police Force

Any discussion of the possibility of federal control of local law enforcement
must begin with the most extreme horrible thrown up by those who debate the
issue - the bugaboo of a national police force. There is an odd universality
in the abhorrence of the idea of a national police force in this country. Conservatives and liberals alike seem opposed to the notion. Strangely enough, one
of the most forceful spokesmen on the subject has been the head of the federal
law enforcement agency that undoubtedly would become the cornerstone of
any national police operation, were that ever to come to pass. J. Edgar Hoover
has said:
The danger of a national police force is that it centralizes into one
place and into the hands of one man too much authority. The Federal
8 Statement of Ramsey Clark, Hearings on H.R. 5037, 5038 Before Subcomm. No. 5
of the House Comm. an the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
House Hearings].
9 For example, see the statement of General Minority Views accompanying the House
Judiciary Committee Report on H.R. 5037:
As we have seen with the 458 existing Federal categorical grant-in-aid programs,
he who pays the piper must necessarily call the tune. Do Americans want law
enforcement in all 50 states to be declared by a non-elected Federal officeholder
in Washington? H.R. RaP. No. 488, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as HousE CoMm. REP.].
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Government, of course, has no cure-all for the crime problems existing in
any community. The need is for effective local action, and this should
begin with the wholehearted support of honest, efficient, local law enforcement.10
Undoubtedly for some people rejection of the idea of a national police
force merely involves a specific application of a particular political philosophy.
According to this philosophy any federal operation of a governmental function
is presumptively bad; state or local governmental control, or even absence of
any governmental involvement at all, is almost always preferable. But the
idea of a national police force also conjures up images inconsistent with our
democratic ideal and touches sensitive nerves deeply-rooted in our traditions.
Many who are not opposed to substantial extensions of federal power in other
areas would be violently opposed to this type of extension. People do not just
reject the idea, they find it abhorrent." It almost seems to qualify as a kind of
taboo. To test this notion, I recently conducted a quick, informal and unscientific "free association" poll among some of my colleagues. Reactions varied to
the question, "What image do the words 'national police force' conjure up for
you?" But the dominant pattern of responses revolved around words like "Gestapo," "Nazism," "stormtroopers," "government by tyranny," and "foreign or
European systems where police snoop about."
What accounts for this seemingly strange pattern of responses?' It may, of
course, be foolish to attempt to account in rational terms for what are, after all,
free-association-type reactions. It is suggested, however, that underlying these
reactions is the image of a very large police force saturating the country, being
used for political purposes and subject to the control of one man. Such a force
smacks of dictatorship and tyranny. No doubt, the experience in Europe in
the 1930's has markedly conditioned our attitudes. Control over such a force
has in many countries been the instrument for assuming dictatorial power. And
the potential for power inherent in a federal police complement of between six
and seven thousand men (taking into account only the FBI)' and a nationallycontrolled force of between three and four hundred thousand men (the present
number of police on the local and state levels) is readily apparent. One could
argue, of course, that the potential for power is already present. The armed
10 Interview with I. Edgar Hoover, U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT, Dec. 21, 1961, p.
38. For his most recent statement on the subject in the same vein, see Message from the
Director, FBI LAW E F. BULL., Feb. 1, 1968, at 1.
11 Interview with J. Edgar Hoover, supra note 10.
12 One colleague has suggested that the test was not a fair one -that
the words "federal
police force" should have been used. He theorized that the word "national" carries with it
association with national socialism and that this accounts for the pattern of reactions. Though
possible, I am skeptical. Also, it is suggested that this proposed phrase does not carry with
it the connotation of as complete a taking-over of the law enforcement function as the words
"national police force." The FBI, for example, might legitimately be identified
as federal
police. Moreover, I am doubtful that the use of the word "national" so frequently used in
our vocabulary conjures up national socialism just because it is juxtaposed to the words police
force.
One might suppose that the reaction is to the word "police" with all the connotations
that word has. But here is a marked difference in the image created by the words "local
police" and "national police."
13 The President in his recent State of the Union Message asked for an increase in

FBI complement by 100 men.
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services are subject to the will of the commander-in-chief. This, however, has
not resulted in dictatorship. Perhaps the fear is that men performing police
functions might lend themselves to more abuse than the armed services which,
fortunately, up to the present have not been used to serve political ends.
The unusual reaction to the notion of a national police force may have other
bases too. Many people think of such force simply as involving an expansion of
the FBI. Thus, reactions to Mr. Hoover, his long tenure and attitudes toward
the Bureau, in general may lie behind this response. Indeed, it may be - this
is very speculative - that the very efficiency and effectiveness of the FBI are a
principal cause of concern. Perhaps expanding such a force to perform the
entire law enforcement function of the nation is more than we are willing to
accept. Perhaps we prefer that our police not be "too good" at their job. In
each of us there is a little bit of the lawbreaker. Perhaps our attitudes toward
the national police force idea reflect this fact.
Rejection of a national police force can, of course, be explained in the more
traditional terms that are used in other areas such as education. In the law
enforcement context the argument takes the following familiar form: It is
undesirable to have the law enforcement function controlled by men in Washington. They are too far away and do not have a feeling for, or understanding
of, local concerns and problems. This argument undoubtedly has some merit.
A partial answer to such a point is that central control does not necessarily mean
distant control. If one really wanted a national police operation, regional and
even local offices subject to a central authority could be set up to cope with
local concerns. Such a structure would no doubt resemble our present system,
with one significant change. The local offices would be subject to the ultimate
control of officials in Washington.
I do not propose the establishment of a national police force. Although
such a force would have some law enforcement advantages, e.g., in coordinating
law enforcement efforts and promoting improved communications on a nationwide basis, there are too many persuasive reasons, reflected in the concerns described above, for rejecting the notion. Moreover, most of the advantages of a
national force may be obtained within our traditional allocation of law enforcement authority.
Though few seriously advocate a national police force, it remains an important issue. For discussion about it arises most frequently in debates over
the possibility of the development of outside control over local law enforcement
through a large-scale federal financial support program. Not only do opponents
of such a program hold up the bugaboo of a national police force, but all of us,
it is submitted, are influenced in our thinking in this area by our reactions to
this notion. It behooves us, therefore, to be aware of and understand what we
mean by and what we fear in the concept of a national police force.
A national police force might also evolve in this country through the
extension of federal criminal law jurisdiction and an expansion of the powers
and numbers of the FBI to enforce that jurisdiction. The Commission made
few recommendations relating to the substantive federal criminal laws although
it did refer approvingly to the federal commission currently charged with re-
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sponsibility for reform of the federal penal law, i.e., the National Commission
on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws. That commission is thus faced with issues
relating to this subject.
III. Federal Control of Local Law Enforcement
Although the national police force idea is often mentioned in debate, few
would allow that there is imminent danger that such a force will be established at least in the present state of national affairs. It is, however, viewed by some
as the possible end result of a growing federal role in local law enforcement.
The more immediate concern for many is that through the development of
new federal programs, the federal government will begin to exercise control over
local law enforcement.
The problem is posed most sharply by legislation currently under consideration in the Congress. As a direct outgrowth of the Commission's recommendations, one year ago the Administration introduced the Safe Streets and
Crime Control Bill. 4 This proposal, amended and renamed the Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Assistance Act, was passed by the House in August,
1967,"5 and is currently under consideration by the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Although there are numerous and substantial differences among the Administration's original bill, the bill reported out by the House Judiciary Committee, the
bill passed by the House, and the bill under consideration in the Senate, all
versions contemplating large-scale financial aid to state and local law enforcement.
The issue is whether such a program is likely to lead to federal control.
The power over the purse strings undoubtedly includes the power to exercise
control over those who are dependent on that purse. Our initial inquiry, therefore, must determine how great that dependency is likely to become. The extent
of potential federal authority over local law enforcement will depend greatly on
how significant a part of the local law enforcement budget the federal dollar is
likely to become. That, in turn, may be determined by the amounts of money
involved, the purposes for which the money may be used, and the extent to
which there is discretion in the grant-making agency to withhold funds unless
the applying local law enforcement agency meets certain conditions.
The Commission saw the federal support program as one on which several
hundred million dollars could be spent annually over the next decade." The
Administration's bill, as originally submitted to Congress, called for fifty million
dollars the first year, and the Attorney General testified that three hundred
million would be requested the second year. He saw the program as possibly
involving the annual expenditure of a billion dollars within the next five years."
The bill passed by the House called for seventy-five million dollars,'" and in his
recent State of the Union Message the President asked for one hundred million
14 H.R. 5037, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
15 Id.
16 CRiME REPORT 284.
17 House Hearings 30.
18 H.R. 5037, supra note 14.
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dollars for fiscal 1969."9 Expenditures for law enforcement and criminal justice
purposes, as estimated by the Commission, presently amount to four billion dollars a year.2" The bulk of this goes to the police, and "85-90 percent of all police
costs are for salaries and wages."'"
Even assuming a substantial increase (apart from the increase represented
by federal money) in local law enforcement expenditures during the next five
years and taking into account other appropriate qualifications,2 2 if the Attorney
General's rather liberal estimate is accurate, federal money could in a short time
constitute a significant proportion of local law enforcement budgets. And even
assuming the somewhat more conservative estimate made by the Commission,
federal financial aid would soon become an important part of the nation's total
law enforcement expenditure. Whatever the uses to which such federal money
might be put, such an extensive support program undoubtedly would tend to
make local governments dependent on the federal government for part of their
budgets.
There will be an even greater potential for control if the federal funds are
used for regularly-recurring costs such as salaries, where additional costs, once
undertaken, are almost impossible to abandon. In addition, of course, the use
of federal money for salaries poses a large problem simply because the salary
item looms so large in law enforcement budgets. In this connection, it is interesting to compare the Administration's proposal concerning the salary issue with
the version of the bill reported out by the House Judiciary Committee and the
one finally passed by the House.
The original proposal took a fairly restrictive approach on the salary issue
and provided that:
[N]ot more than one-third of any grant . . .shall be expended for the
compensation of personnel, except that this limitation shall not apply to
the compensation of personnel for time engaged in conducting or undergoing training
programs and specialized personnel performing innovative
23
functions.
The House Judiciary Committee reported out a bill that went even further
and completely barred the use of grants for compensation of personnel, with the
same two exceptions provided for in the original bill.24 The bill passed by the
House, however, contained neither provision and would appear to authorize federal grants to be used for salary purposes without limitation.2" If it is true, as
suggested, that the use of a grant for such a continuing expense - particularly
one that is such a major portion of the law enforcement budget - gives a larger
potential for control to the grant-making authority, the bill passed by the House
19 N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1968, at 16, col. 5.
20 CRIM. REPORT 35.

21 Id.

22 For example, the fact that a substantial amount of federal money will not go into
direct support of law enforcement but rather into research by universities, research institutes
and the like.
23 H.R. 5037, § 202(a) (2), supra note 14.
24 Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Assistance Act § 202(b), House CoMm.

REP. 18.
25

H.R. 5037, supra note 14.
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goes further in this direction than any of the earlier versions. Interestingly enough,
as developed later in this paper, that potential under the House bill seems to be
vested in the states and not the federal government.
Another element that may affect the potential of a large grant program for
federal control is the amount of discretion in the grant-making authority to
impose conditions on the recipient of a grant. All three versions of the proposed
legislation give to the grant-making authority a certain amount of discretion
through the requirement that an approved plan must be submitted if a grant
is to be obtained.2 6 The power to approve the plan 7 carries the discretion with it. The bills themselves describe the expected content of the
plan in general terms; presumably, further details will be spelled out in regulations. Inevitably, though, some discretion will remain in the grant-making
authority to determine whether there has been compliance with the standards
contained in the statute and regulations. In view of this, it seems fair to say that
the type of program contemplated carries with it a potential for the exercise of
some control by the grant-making authority over local law enforcement. The
question remains whether that leverage is likely to be exercised, and if so, how.
At the outset, it is worthwhile pointing out that no one can predict with
certainty the course of development of a governmental program of the type
described. At best, one can engage in reasonable speculation based upon those
elements presently perceived. There are, of course, many analogies that could
be relied upon - such as federal aid to education and the poverty program. Although such analogies are not irrelevant, it must be remembered that each federal
grant program has its own special characteristics. The risk that the federal
government will use the potential for control inherent in a grant program of
this sort to begin to "take over" the operation of local police agencies is minimal,
despite the dire predictions of opponents of the program.2" This conclusion is
not based on an altruistic view of the world or on the notion that officials of
the federal government are any the less corruptible by power than the average
man. Rather, the exercise of detailed control over local operations by a central
authority - even given the leverage that a large-scale grant program would
provide - is just not feasible. The number of local police jurisdictions in this
country is enormous, by one count over forty thousand.29 Any attempt to regulate
the details of so many police operations would require the creation of a huge
federal establishment. At the very least, a large number of regional and local
offices would be required, and a large staff of federal inspectors to police the
police would be necessary. There is no indication that anything like that is contemplated. Such an establishment could not be created without congressional
awareness and objection. Surely Congress would not stand still for it, and ultimate power over this and any other government grant program remains in the
hands of Congress through the device of the annual appropriation. Indeed, the
26 See, e.g., id. § 204.
27 Id. § 202. The administration's bill, as originally introduced in the House of Representatives on Feb. 8, 1967, contained a fairly detailed formula, abandoned in later versions,
application of which would affect the amount of the grant but not the extent of discretion
possessed by the Attorney General.
28 HousE CoMm. REP. 40-41 (separate views of Hon. Edward Hutchinson).
29 House Hearings 29.
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executive may control the drawstring of the purse, giving him some power over
local agencies, but Congress, in the last analysis, controls the size of that purse.
There remains to consider the argument that this program of federal grants
is just the opening wedge - that:
[G]eneral acceptance of the scheme of this bill will result in making State
and local law enforcement agencies so financially dependent upon Federal
support that they will be unable to give it up. And in order to keep receiving Federal aid they will more and more, a little at a time, give up their
local and State control over police, until finally they are persuaded that
law enforcement
is a national problem and no longer a local or State
30
responsibility.
One may as well argue that the establishment of the FBI was the first step down
the primrose path toward a national police force. It will be time enough to
worry about such dangers when they loom larger and more realistically on the
horizon.
To conclude that comprehensive federal control over the details of police
operations will not come about as a result of this type of grant program does not
entirely dispose of the federal control issue. A persuasive argument can be made
that a financial aid program might cause "selective" control over local law
enforcement. By selective control the grant-making authority may require a
particular applying local jurisdiction to meet certain conditions, to do or not
do something, or to modify its practices in a specified manner. Because of the
limitations of manpower and the number of jurisdictions involved, this would
necessarily occur only on a selective basis. It would not involve a comprehensive
takeover of the local police operation, nor would it constitute the first step toward
such a takeover or toward a national police force. Nevertheless, it would involve "those fellows" in Washington (or in a state capital) telling a local authority
how to run some aspects of its affairs. This would clearly constitute a departure,
though limited in scope, from the long-standing tradition of complete independence of the local government in the police area. The question is whether
or not this is objectionable.
The answer has to be that it depends on how wisely and judiciously this
newfound power is exercised by the grant-making authority. The mere expenditure of additional sums of money will not automatically improve our systems of
law enforcement and criminal justice. Simply adding to the number of police
will not solve our problems. There must be improvements of all types in the
functioning of the system. The entire thrust of the Commission's Report was to
this effect. There was a large emphasis on specific types of improvements such as
more training, pooling of resources, services and information, and the use of
innovative methods generally.3 ' On one level, it might be said that the grant30 Housa CoMm. REP. 40-41.
31 The program of Federal support recommended by the Commission would be directed
to eight major needs:
(1) State and local planning.
(2) Education and training of criminal justice personnel.
(3) Surveys and advisory services concerning the organization and operation of
police departments, courts, prosecuting offices, and corrections agencies.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[Symposium, 1968]

making authority has a responsibility to see that the new funds are used re-

sponsibly in a way that will best contribute to the improvement of the system.
No one believes that the Department of Justice as a grant maker will have
extraordinary wisdom in these matters. But it will have the advantage of its
position as a central coordinating agency. 2 If it does its job well, it will quickly
accumulate a wealth of experience and knowledge. In administering the program it will, for example, be able to apply the experience in the use of new
techniques that will be fed into it from all over the country. Undoubtedly local

officials will always have a better sense of their own problems, but there is no
reason in principle why the grant maker should not use his leverage to encourage
improvements in local practice. No doubt, if used excessively, such exertion of
authority will result in friction between grantor and grantee. The local jurisdictions should generally welcome a certain amount of guidance of this sort, provided
that it is sensible and does not concern itself too much with the matters of detail. 3
There are some who will find any such selective influence on local law enforcement objectionable. Others will only object if the type of influence exercised
interferes with local interests deemed particularly important.
There are familiar areas where the exercise of this type of leverage will be
objected to by the local governments. For example, when the federal grantmaking authority attempts, as it must, to invoke the provisions of Title VI

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 "4 against a Southern county that discriminates
in its hiring of police officers, there will undoubtedly be a large outcry. That
issue will be a sensitive one whether the federal program involved education,
urban redevelopment, poverty, or law enforcement. While most persons have
no difficulty justifying this type of. string on the use of federal funds, it is con-

ceded that one's reaction to such an exercise of control may be determined by
one's attitude toward the merits of the matter. It should be emphasized, how-

ever, that the congressional policy judgment has previously been made in Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act and that the problem is not peculiar to this particular
grant program. Members of the Senate sub-committee hearing testimony on this
(4) Development of a coordinated national information system for operational and
research purposes.
(5) Funding of limited numbers of demonstration programs in agencies of justice.
(6) Scientific and technological research and development.
(7) Development of national and regional research centers.
(8) Grants-in-aid for operational innovations. CRIME REPORT xl.
32 The Commission's final conclusion about a Federal anticrime program is that the
major responsibility for administering it should lie with the Department of Justice:
. . . In the Department of Justice alone among Federal agencies there is a large
existing pool of practical knowledge about the police, the courts and the correctional
system .... The Department of Justice has a Criminal Division, one of whose most
important sections is concerned with organized crime and racketeering. It has the
recently established Office of Criminal Justice, which has concentrated on criminal
reform. Many of the research and demonstration portions of the Commission's program are already authorized under the Law Enforcement Assistance Act, which is
administered by the Department of Justice. If it is given the money and the men
it will need, the Department of Justice can take the lead in the Nation's efforts
against crime. CRIME REPORT 284-85.
33 See, e.g., testimony on behalf of the National League of Cities, House Hearings 381-86.
34 The pertinent statutory language is to be found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) which provides: "No person ... shall . . . be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance."
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matter raised the related problem of whether factors such as racial imbalance
might be taken into account in determining whether to make a grant even where
there was no evidence of discrimination constituting a violation of Title VI."
The issue is a difficult one. If racial imbalance were likely to introduce malfunctioning into the operation of the system - for example, in connection with
the operation of a police community relations program - then it could plausibly
be taken into account in determining whether to make the grant. Such factors,
absent evidence of discrimination, generally would not be central elements in
the grant-making process, and it would be regrettable if congressional concern
about them were to affect the basic structure of the program.
Thus far, this article has focused on the potential for control of local law
enforcement inherent in a large financial aid program. Before leaving this
subject, however, it is important to call attention to the potential for control
involved in other activities of the federal government related to local law enforcement. For it would seem likely that those who will not be reassured on
the subject of federal control in connection with a grant program would also
be concerned about other forms of increased federal activity. Consider, for example, the recommendations of the Commission for dealing with the problems
of communications and obtaining information in a locally-oriented law enforcement system:
An integrated national information system is needed to serve the combined needs at the National, State, regional and metropolitan or county
levels of the police, courts, and correction agencies, and of the public and
the research community. Each of these agencies has information needed
by others; an information system provides a means for collecting it, analyzing it, and disseminating it to those who need it. Each can be kept in
close communication with the others, and information transferred by voice,
by teletype, or computer to computer.
Since law enforcement is primarily a local and State function, the
overall program must be geared to the circumstances and requirements of
local and State agencies; and, wherever practical, the files should be located
at these levels.38
In a similar vein, the Commission said:
A national inquiry file (the National Crime Information Center - NCIC)
is now being established by the FBI. This file will contain records of all
cars reported stolen for more than 24 hours, all persons wanted for extraditable offenses, stolen guns, and all stolen identifiable property valued at
over $1,000. This file will be maintained on a computer, with terminals
initially connected to 15 police agencies, and with plans to include all
States eventually . . . . The utility of a fully interconnected national inquiry file depends on the need for interstate and interregional communications and on the need to provide an inquiry capability for those States that
It is important that the States, in asdo not establish their own files ....
sessing their own needs and developing their own computer facilities, and
the FBI in operating the NCIC, seek to develop information that will
35
36

Id.
CRr E REPORT 267.
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provide a basis for a sound
decision on the needs for and the form of a
37
national inquiry system.
It is worth noting that the Commission was extremely cautious in both of
these recommendations and emphasized developments at the local level, for such
inquiry and information systems also have a potential for growth into instruments
of control. Indeed, dependence of local police operations on an outside authority
might more easily come about through control over an information system upon
which day-to-day operations are dependent than through a grant program where
grants are made only annually.
Consider also the provisions of the bill passed by the House that provided
for the establishment within the Department of Justice of a National Institute
of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice."5 That Institute is "to establish and
operate regional institutes for the training of State and local law enforcement
personnel,".. 9 "to make continuing studies and undertake programs of research," 4
and "to carry out a program of behavioral research."'" The Institute is also to
"establish such laboratories and research facilities as may be necessary to carry
out the program described." 4 2 The director may determine the "conditions"
under which payments are to be made to individual trainees." These, of course,
are the type of activities described in the Commission Report that have been

carried on for many years by the federal government. But the establishment and
operation of regional training institutes would seem to involve a marked expansion of this type of direct activity by the federal government. Indeed, it
is somewhat ironic that the House bill which in a sense attempted to limit the

power of the federal government over financial aid to local law enforcement,
actually expanded the direct involvement of the government in training and
related activities. Again, the potential for influence and control over local law

enforcement through mass training of its officers probably poses as great (or as
small) a risk as that offered through a large-scale grant program.
These examples are cited not to oppose such developments in training and
information systems. The fact, however, that they, too, do raise the control issue
should be explicitly faced. It is not an evil for the federal government judiciously
and on a selective basis to use the leverage it obtains through these various programs to effect improvements in local law enforcement and criminal justice
systems. In many jurisdictions, it may be the only way to accomplish such
changes.
IV. State Control
The question of whether, in a large-scale program of financial aid for state
37 Id. at 268. In this connection, attention should be called to an amendment incorporated
into section 412 of the version of H.R. 5037 passed by the House that required annual reports
describing data storage and retrieval systems employed for the storage of criminal intelligence
data by the Department of Justice and by any recipient of funds under the act who uses such
funds for such systems.
38 H.R. 5037, Title IV, supra note 14.
39 Id. § 301, as passed by the House, Aug. 8, 1967.

40 Id.§ 303(2).
41 Id.§ 303(3).
43

Id. § 307(b).
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Id. § 304.
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and local law enforcement, state governments should be involved other than as
direct recipients of grants poses issues closely related to those previously discussed.
If, for example - to consider the matter in its most extreme form - the federal
government were simply to make large bloc grants to each state, perhaps according to a specified formula, and the state were then to make the specific grants
to the various local law enforcement agencies within its borders, the issue of
federal control would largely evaporate. Proposals for state involvement of this
type raise other problems that have also come up in connection with other federal
grant programs, e.g., aid to education, and involve problems of taxation and
economics that transcend the scope of this paper. Those problems, however, that
particularly relate to a financial aid program in the law enforcement field are
the subject of this section.
The House action last August on H.R. 5037 provided for federal grants
to state planning agencies which would then administer the money for the entire
state." Both earlier versions of the bill, the one introduced by the Administration"'
and the one reported out by the House Judiciary Committee,4 had provided for
the making of grants by the federal government directly to local governments.
The issues here are, of course, central to the basic structuring of the entire grant
program. Since the full Senate Judiciary Committee recently reported out a
version of the bill that on this issue follows the pattern of the administration bill,
as of the date of this writing, the issue is still an open one that may, if the Senate
adopts its committee's bill, have to be resolved in conference between the two
houses.
The bill passed by the House places primary authority over the distribution
of funds and over guidelines for their expenditure in the state governments. The
question thus becomes whether such an approach is preferable to one which
gives the federal government that responsibility. Putting aside ideology, considerations of the general relationship between the functions of the state and
federal governments, and the revenue and economic factors previously mentioned,
the issue turns on which approach is best designed to improve the overall quality
of law enforcement and criminal justice.
The case to be made for the House approach is not unpersuasive. The Commission, for example, recognized that "much of the planning for action against
crime will have to be done at the State level"4 7 and recommended that "[a]
State or local government that undertakes to improve its criminal administration
should begin by constructing... formal machinery for planning." 4 The Commission did not, however, go so far as to recommend that this state planning
machinery should be used as a conduit for the federal funds to be distributed
to local governments (although it did recommend that federal grants should be
made to the states to support and encourage such planning).49 There is in fact
no dispute about the value of such planning and coordination activities on the
44 Id. §§ 201-03.
45 Id. § 201 '(introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressman Emanuel
Cellar, Feb. 8, 1967).
46 HousE Comm. REP. 17-18.
47
pamE RERSORT 280.
48 Id. at 279.
49 Id. at 285.
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state level. Thus, for example, in response to a call from the President in October,
1966, the first meeting of the State Criminal Justice Planning Committee was
held. And the bill introduced by the Administration provided for federal planning grants to both state and local governments.5" On the same subject, the Attorney General testified:
We think it is awfully important to get the States started where they are
not, because their plan can affect the other jurisdictions. So we would
hope to have all of the States really working toward a fully comprehensive
plan for the State.-"
The issue, then, is not whether states should be encouraged to engage in planning and coordination activities but whether they should be given a large or
controlling voice in the distribution of money to local governments.
It can be argued that by channeling funds through the states, they will
thereby be given the "muscle" to ensure that comprehensive planning and coordination on a statewide basis are carried out. Congressman William Cahill
stated this argument in his Additional Views to the Report of the House Judiciary
Committee:
Under the planning mechanism provided by the present bill, pressure
by local citizens and officials will force each individual local government
to make hurried and separate applications for Federal assistance. In this
nationwide competition for funding, there will be little time for the careful thought necessary to formulate "innovative" or "comprehensive" programs. Moreover, in the absence of effective State planning agencies there
is little stimulus for increased coordination and cooperation among local
law enforcement and judicial authorities; while the bill permits the chief
executives of the several States to comment to the U.S. Attorney General
on applications by local authorities, there is no assurance that such recommendations will be followed nor that final approval of the application will
be in accordance with overall State objectives.
The administration's principal objection to statewide planning is that Governors have limited responsibility for and experience in law enforcement
and are primarily concerned with the
52 State police and their involvement
in traffic control. (Emphasis added.)
With respect to the Congressman's last point, it is worth repeating that no one
objects to statewide planning. The question is how can that goal be best
accomplished.
The discourse on this issue has tended to focus on the extent of state
activities in the law enforcement and criminal justice field. The Attorney General has argued in this regard: "When you look at the state governments and
look at their involvement in local law enforcement, you will see that it is almost
nil."' Congressman Cahill has replied that "many Governors have sig50 H.R. 5037, § 102, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
51 House Hearings 56.
52 House COMM. REP. 31.
53 House Hearings65.
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nificant roles in law enforcement and criminal justice.

'5 4

With the exception
of the operation of the courts and correctional systems, the Attorney General
has much the better argument. But it has not been made clear why the nature
and extent of present state involvement in law enforcement are relevant. The
fact that state governments are or are not heavily engaged in law enforcement
activities certainly directly affects the need of such goveriients for financial aid.
It relates to the structuring of the grant program, however, only in a more indirect fashion.
In the first place, the extent of present state involvement in this area may
affect the willingness of local governments to accept direction from the states.
If, as the Attorney General suggests, state governments have not previously been
very active in law enforcement, the problem of outside control of local law enforcement may be just as serious where the state government is attempting to
provide direction as where the federal government uses the power of the purse
for that purpose. For example, a local police chief might find it just as
objectionable to be instructed by the state attorney general as by the U.S.
Attorney General. Indeed, from the point of view of local government, the
problem of control from outside may be more serious where the state government distributes the funds. By the very nature of things, state officials are likely
to attempt to exercise tighter control than would federal officers, for they are
closer to the scene. Whether this proximity is sufficient to justify greater intervention in local affairs, however, is debatable. Also, state officials have responsibility for a much smaller area and population than does the federal government. Such a factor, on the one hand, permits closer attention to what needs
to be done; on the other, it makes probable much greater interference with essentially local control. The possibilities for a takeover of the details of local law
enforcement operations, as distinguished from the type of selective control
previously described, will be much greater where the effective grantor is the
state rather than the federal government. This is particularly true where there
are already aspects of the system traditionally operated by the states - courts and
corrections. Thus, the possibility of the growth of true state police forces throughout the country under such an approach is not an unreal one. There are many
who would consider such a development almost as bad as the idea of a national
police force.
There is also the problem of existing friction between state and local government. It is, of course, present in some parts of the country and absent in others.
This may reflect inter-party tensions - some of our larger cities are run by
administrations of one party while the state houses are in the hands of the other
party - or simply result from the fact that state and local governments continually come into contact and often conflict on many issues - for example,
division of state tax revenues. The fact of closer contact, however, may also cut
the other way. The balance of state politics may permit a local government to
influence the administration of the grant program more easily where it is operated
by the state.
Friction, of course, can also exist on the federal-level, but historically there
54
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have been fewer contacts between local government and Washington and therefore fewer conflicts. This pattern has been changing under recent federal grant
programs, and it may be that the problem on the federal level will grow worse.
Oddly, the fact that the basic decision making occurs in Washington may, at least
from the point of view of the Congress, ease the problem. For, if such friction develops, Congress can have a large impact in resolving the conflict. Giving the
primary responsibility to the states, however, may, in a sense, dilute or at least
adversely affect potential congressional influence over the tone of the program.
The nature and extent of existing state involvement in law enforcement
activities may be thought to affect the capability of the states to handle the
grant-making function. That involvement, limited in most states, has nowhere
involved state-wide planning or coordination of police activities. Nor, more
importantly, has it had anything at all to do with the discretionary distribution
of financial aid to local law enforcement. The states would thus come to this
activity with no significant background in grant making. To implement the
House bill they would be required to "tool up" quickly, to establish an office,
and to hire specialized personnel. Major legislative as well as executive decisions
would be necessary. A considerable effort would thus be required. For each
individual state, though, the task would not be insuperable. The planning committees initiated at the President's call in 1966 might provide the nucleus of the
operation, and some states have already taken legislative action to authorize such
an office. The California legislature, for example, recently established the California Council on Criminal Justice55 to, inter alia, "develop plans to fulfill the
requirements of any federal act providing for the adoption of comprehensive plans
to facilitate the receipt and allocation of federal funds .... .,",
Looking to the larger picture, however, it is too much to expect each of
the fifty states to tool up an adequate operation in the near future. The task
of staffing fifty such offices in a relatively short period of time seems an impossible
one. Indeed, one of the large, pervasive problems currently being faced in attempts to implement the Commission's recommendations is that of finding qualified personnel adequately trained in the problems of police, courts, and corrections. All of this is not to say that it will not be possible eventually to develop
and staff such an operation. To condition the entire program on the existence
of comprehensive state plans and to rely on the states to engage in the actual
distribution of the federal money, however, would cause intolerable delays in
implementing the grant program.
The House bill contains a provision that is apparently designed to meet
this problem;"7 if so, it fails miserably. It gives a state three months after the
effective date of the act to establish a state planning agency and six months after
the establishment of the state planning agency to file a comprehensive plan.
If these deadlines are not met, the Attorney General is authorized to make grants
directly to local governments. The deadlines, however, are unrealistic, although
the likelihood is that they will be met. Thus, this approach puts a premium
55
56
57

13800 (1967).
Id. § 13806.
H.R. 5037, § 305, supra note 50.
CAL. PENAL CODE §
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on haste and sloppiness. Moreover, it is not just that the deadlines are wrong.
Any time period will impose an unrealistic limitation on what ought to be a
continuing planning process.
The objection may be made that the federal government also lacks experience in this field and will have to "tool up." But there are significant differences.
The federal government has for almost three years been making grants to local
law enforcement agencies and others under the Law Enforcement Assistance
Act of 1965. During this period the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance
has distributed approximately seven million dollars annually for research and
a variety of experimental and demonstration projects to improve law enforcement and criminal justice operations.58 It has a staff of more than twenty-five
persons who have already built up a wealth of experience and expertise in this
new field of grant making. Not only is the federal government more advanced
in its preparations to undertake a large-scale grant-making program, but it is
undoubtedly more feasible to quickly staff and organize a single, central office
than it is to build up fifty such operations. Finally, there are some particular
practical disadvantages in using the states as conduits for the funds. The money
involved in such a program would necessarily pass through more hands. And
more opportunities for bureaucratic mistake, mishandling, corruption, or delay
would thereby be created.
Although a case can be made for enlarging the state's role in the grant
program - in order to encourage statewide planning and coordination, to build
is
diversity into the program, and to beef up operations on the state level -it
submitted that an approach that gives state governments the primary responsibility for distributing funds to local governments is bound to fragment and
complicate the implementation of the program and hinder the progress of its
development. It is suggested, however, that one can foresee how, at some future
date, a state office might reach a level of operation where it could perform the
distribution function as well as a federal office. Perhaps the answer then is to
establish initially a federally-controlled program but to build into it a feature
whereby, after a period of time, the federal office would hand over certain
authority to a state operation that met specified criteria.5 9
V. Conclusion
One must be enough of a political realist to recognize that no matter how
persuasive the arguments concerning the proper functioning of the program,
there are other factors that weigh heavily in the legislative balance scale. And
58 House Hearings 33.
59 This approach might be viewed as the reverse of the provision of the House act that
gave the federal government a power of reverter where the state failed to file a comprehensive
plan. It is not clear under that provision whether, once a state fails to meet the deadline,
the power of the federal government continues throughout the existence of the program or
whether a late-applying state can re-obtain the power of distribution.
There are other possible compromises on the state control issue. The bill reported out
by the House committee provided for submission of all applications to the chief executive of
the state. Other grant legislation contains a governor's veto provision, e.g., the Economic
Opportunity Act. That legislation was amended in 1965 to give the Director of the OEO
authority to override a veto by a governor.
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what are those other factors? To cite just a few, political ideology no doubt
plays a role for some. For others, the issue may be viewed as a simple question
of raw political power. Where is it best to locate the power that will accompany
the distribution of the funds that will be involved in this program? For still
others, the matter may somehow be tied to civil rights issues. Based upon a civil
rights criterion, is a federal or a state-oriented program preferable? Finally, there
will be some for whom the state-federal control issue is itself not a matter
of great importance. Rather, the question will present the opportunity to score
political points or to trade off on other matters of legislative importance. An
illustration in point is the fact that the full Senate Judiciary Committee recently
reported out the Safe Streets measure with a new Title II containing provisions
attempting, among other things, to overrule Supreme Court decisions in Miranda
v. Arizona,6" United States v. Wade, 1 and Mallory v. United States. 2
Perhaps it is too much to ask that such considerations be ignored. For the
legislative process is, after all, a process of compromise and adjustment in which
the circle of relevance may be deemed very wide indeed. We can only hope
that, whatever the reasoning, the resulting legislation will quickly be enacted in a
form that will create a program well structured to "increase the effectiveness,
fairness, and coordination of law enforcement and criminal justice systems at
'3
all levels of government."
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